Max Weber and the Origin of Human Rights: A Study on Cultural Innovation.
There can be little doubt that a belief in human rights and the dignity of the human person is one of the most important characteristics of our time, at least since the end of the Second World War and to an even greater degree following the collapse of communism in Europe. While this development was anticipated by a few sociological theorists, such as Émile Durkheim, it stands in sharp tension with the gloomy prognoses about the future that Max Weber formulated on various occasions. What is more, since human rights are rarely discussed in Weber's gigantic oeuvre, the question of their origins may at first seem rather marginal for the study of his work.
However, it can be shown that the origin of this value complex -so central to the modern ageyields an interesting perspective on several aspects of Weber's sociology.
In his empirical views about the origins of human rights, Max Weber was completely dependent on the research of his friends and colleagues Georg Jellinek and Ernst Troeltsch. So it seems sensible that we begin with them. This detour will allow us to pursue three different goals at once. First, it will enable us to formulate the problem more clearly. Second, by contrasting Weber's views with those of his contemporaries, we can more precisely specify his position.
Third, and finally, this contrast will allow us to draw some conclusions regarding the interpretive power of the so-called Weber paradigm.
Our reflections begin with a scene. It takes place on an October evening in 1922 in downtown Berlin, when the German College for Politics ("Deutsche Hochschule für Politik") is celebrating its second anniversary in a famous building, Schinkel's Bauakademie. The President of the Reich, Friedrich Ebert, and outstanding figures in Berlin's academic-intellectual life, such as the historians Friedrich Meinecke, Erich Marcks, and Hans Delbrück had accepted the invitation of this newly-created institution, which had set itself the goal of promoting adult education in the spirit of democracy and therefore had a somewhat difficult task in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The keynote address was given by one of the greatest scholars of the old Kaiserreich, the Protestant theologian, historian, and philosopher Ernst Troeltsch; the topic was "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics. What was so special about this lecture? Its unique contribution lies in a remarkably productive confrontation between the Western human rights tradition and a sophisticated conception of individuality, creativity and self-realization that was developed primarily in Germany. At the same time, Troeltsch's tone was entirely sober and calm. Troltsch had stood at the frontlines of the heated nationalist output of university professors and the public intellectual debates that took place during the first years of the War, and had mostly emphasized the differences between Germany and the West in his own interventions. Though highly knowledgeable and generally above crude stereotypes, he was mainly interested in marking an impassable cultural and political boundary. The war's events and outcome did not drive him further in the direction of nationalistic radicalism, however, as they did others, such as Oswald
Spengler. Neither did Troeltsch simply conform to the new circumstances for external or strategic reasons, by adopting the guise of a "rational republican", nor throw himself into the arms of the West, in a complete about-face. Rather, he attempted, by means of a genuine and deep-reaching auto-critique, to break open the disastrous alliance that had formed between the German understanding of individuality and the glorification of raison d'état and power politics.
To reach this goal, he first showed clearly that the ideas of natural law and humanity were not, as was often assumed, "merely modern or merely West European concepts", but rather "ideas of great antiquity (…) and of general European scope; ideas which are the basis of our European In fact, since Herder and Humboldt, a significant strand of German thought had conceived of the human person neither as a utility-maximizing individual nor as a rational subject following the dictates of morality, but rather as a being that expresses itself, and in this sense realizes itself, in its utterances and acts. 6 In this view, individuals are not just so many identical atoms, whose relationships to each other are subject to universal laws; rather they are highly unique personalities that undergo complex developmental processes as they seek out a path to self-realization through their own actions. This epochal transformation in thought also resulted in a new and different understanding of "community", which is sharply distinguished from contractual relationships; of humanity, which is conceived as the struggle of the national spirits; and of history, which is not interpreted as progress. For Troeltsch --and he believes for us --this transformation cannot simply be undone, any more than this demanding new understanding of all individuality --including our own -can be renounced. His gesture consists not in any such retraction, but rather in the very insistence with which he questions the political On the other hand, we must determine whether the ethos of self-realization necessarily entails a In answering this question, we must continually bear in mind three different time periods.
The first period is the late 18th century, when declarations of human rights were proclaimed in North America and France. The second period is the time around 1900, when the question of the Christian, and specifically Protestant, roots of modernity more generally became a key subject of intellectual debate. And the third time period is, of course, the present day, from which we look back over the development of human rights and the effects of their changing historical interpretations (Wirkungsgeschichte Despite all the objections that were and are raised against it, much of Jellinek's argument can now be regarded as well-confirmed. He was correct not only in his emphasis on the chronological priority of the American declarations of human rights and their influence on the French "Déclaration" (though the latter one certainly was no mere imitation of the American declarations). He was also correct when he pointed out that there is a difference between theories of natural law, on the one hand, and, on the other, the legal codification of specific individual rights that are supposed to hold for all people and be removed from legislative authority.
[T]he assertion of objective moral and legal limits to all worldly powers," writes Hasso Hofmann, agreeing with Jellinek, does not itself devolve into "a theory of subjective rights. The idea of constitutional freedom and security against illegal tyranny is not equivalent to the human rights idea of basic, individual freedoms and protection against legal tyranny." 21 We must also agree with Jellinek when he rejects the view that the English legal tradition, with its codification of rights and freedoms, led directly to the declarations of human rights of the late 18th century, since these guarantees only applied to the traditional rights of the subjects of the English king and by no means to all people. It is also true that Rousseau cannot be regarded as the source of 19 These tensions in Jellinek's thought have been particularly intensely pursued in: Jens Kersten (2000) , Georg
Jellinek und die klassische Staatslehre, Tübingen. He too sees Jellinek's theory of the state as an attempted "mediation between facticity and normativity" (p. 5) on historical and statist ground. Compare also p. 410: "The theory of self-commitment wants to answer the question pertaining specifically to German constitutionalism: how a factual national will that is conceived as formally free of any legal commitment can include normativity." He admittedly accuses Jellinek's thought of being visibly anchored in the German tradition of the predemocratic power state, in the primacy of the state over the citizens, and of failing to understand the basic rights in the sense of a charter of a commonwealth of citizens (compare p. 427). In this, Kersten's proximity to contract-theoretical ideas and the French tradition becomes apparent. He does not deal with the intrinsic difficulties of these, which causes his judgment concerning Jellinek to turn out somewhat one-sided.
inalienable rights to freedom that also apply against the state, since he had argued precisely against any limitations on the legislative power of popular sovereignty. In this political respect, Rousseaus is better seen as representing the collectivist pole of the French declaration of human rights, rather than the individualistic one, even if we do not want to claim that the same unresolved tension is found in his work as in the "Déclaration". If one can thus say today, notwithstanding certain opposing voices, that there is a widespread consensus in favor of Jellinek on all of these points, then the debate narrows to the last, and in any case boldest thesis of the book, namely, the thesis that the American declarations of human rights had religious roots.
Here, the utmost caution is necessary. We must first demonstrate that we are not simply dealing with an intellectual background. Of course, Jellinek was aware that the belief in the dignity of all people had deep roots in the centuries-old Judeo-Christian tradition --though this tradition cannot be treated as a unbroken process of maturation that gave rise to modern ideas, especially when one considers how often its universalism was violated, when Jews, heretics, or native peoples were denied these selfsame rights. The intellectual roots of human rights in Renaissance humanism, the Reformation, or Spanish late scholasticism are in general less interesting for an understanding of our problem than are the dynamics of their sudden institutionalization. And it is here that Jellinek saw the struggle of American Protestants, especially the (Calvinist) Congregationalists, for religious freedom as decisive. Although religious toleration can be observed in the most varied regimes-the enlightened absolutism of Frederick the Great in Prussia, for example, or colonial Maryland under Catholic leadershiputilitarian calculations usually formed the basis for policies of toleration. Jellinek, however, was interested in the religious roots of the struggle for religious freedom -meaning religious freedom not just for one's own confession but for all believers. This is a highly salient topic today-as the threat from Islamic fundamentalism clearly shows. Accordingly, the hero of Jellinek's story is the Puritan preacher Roger Williams, who left Massachusetts in 1636 for Rhode Island, where he guaranteed religious freedom not only for Christians of all sorts but also "for Jews, heathens, and Turks". Jellinek's central thesis is that: "The idea of securing the inalienable, inborn, and sacred rights of the individual in the law is of religious rather than political origin. What has hitherto been viewed as a product of the [French] Revolution is in fact a fruit of the Reformation and its struggles. Its first apostle is not Lafayette, but rather Roger Williams who, driven by powerful, deeply religious enthusiasm, sets off into the wilderness to found a realm of religious freedom, and whose name is still mentioned with reverence by Americans today." 22 According to Jellinek, all other individual rights, such as freedom of opinion, of the press, and of assembly-stem from this source. The whole idea that individuals not only have rights within a state, but also rights against the state, and that these are not simply conferred by the state, points to a religious origin, at least in the sense of a historical explanation.
Our current state of knowledge necessitates three corrections to Jellinek's fourth thesis.
The first of these corrections stems from none other than Ernst Troeltsch. For him, it was not the Calvinists, as for Jellinek, but rather the Baptists, Quakers, and certain types of free spirituality -- To do so, would be an injustice to the actual dynamics of institutionalization.
At the same time, however -and this is the third correction --we should not underestimate the role of religious interpretations and motives at this time either. Rather, we must abandon this un-dialectical opposition of two explanatory hypotheses, one of which gives 22 for strategic reasons no doubt, to increase its acceptance among the citizens, but certainly also out of true conviction. Even if the other human rights thus do not follow from religious freedom in an organic fashion, religious freedom was nevertheless understood in the America of the late 18th century "as the 'first freedom', as the most significant and important of the freedom rights, the one that formed the basis for the entire rest of the constitution." 25 In this modified form, Jellinek's thesis regarding the religious roots of the declaration of human rights can indeed be considered as well-confirmed for North America.
If this is true, this thesis has important implications for our understanding of modernity, of which human rights are incontestably a part. For it destabilizes the view that the development of human rights is part of a larger process, sometimes referred to as the sacralization or charismatization of reason. For some authors 26 who build on Max Weber, the origin of human rights plays itself out exclusively in the context of a belief in rationality whose characteristic expression is Robespierre's quasi-religious "cult of reason", but which continued on in Marxism's pretences towards a "scientific socialism".
Let us consult Max Weber himself at this point. However strongly he may have been influenced by Jellinek (and Troeltsch) in these matters, he nonetheless gave their arguments a particular twist, by integrating them into his theory of occidental rationalism and its future. At first glance, Jellinek's thesis seems to fit perfectly into this framework, which is, of course, no coincidence, since Weber's own studies on Puritanism had been strongly inspired by Jellinek's book. The way in which the subject of human rights surfaces in Weber's Soziologische Grundbegriffe [Basic Concepts in Sociology] is nonetheless a bit jarring. Though few have noticed it, Weber refers to human rights in this context as "extremely rationalistic fanaticisms"
and as the epitome of those ultimate ends or values, that, like "religious and charitable virtuoso performances for those not receptive to them," are barely understandable if at all for one who does not share them or who "radically abhors them." 27 Here, Weber was surely thinking of the French-Enlightenment version of human rights. But for him there was no contradiction between this emphasis on the rationalistic character of human rights and their religious roots, since he was interested precisely in the religious roots also of such "extremely rationalistic fanaticisms". For
Weber, the Enlightenment, as a mere negation of tradition, would have been too weak to effect such an intensification of belief. In this sense, Jellinek's thesis anticipates Weber's views regarding the religious roots of the rational, capitalist spirit.
In other contexts Weber relates human rights to the expansion of capitalism and the progress of bureaucratization. For him it is clear "that the demand for formal, legal equality and 26 Günther Roth (1987) New forms of religious conviction have emerged during the 20th century. The inherent tendencies of moral judgment promote universalistic moral orientations. The history of violence and of human degradation has led in some places to a clearer awareness that the dignity of the person must be inviolable. Capitalism has experienced long phases of prosperity, and the construction of welfare states has demonstrated that divergent interests can be reconciled in a peaceful and just manner, even if it has not revived the belief in a natural harmony of interests.
The expansion of education has led to the emergence of new milieus in which a belief in human rights is widespread. And Weber surely exaggerated the degree to which the lower middle-class and the creative entrepreneurial spirit were in retreat. Weber unites his thesis about the religious roots of modern individualism and his diagnosis of the present in the form of a tragedy. In this construal, religious forces bring about a regime that takes the life out of these very forces. If, however, Weber's historical prognoses --or, better, his sociological assumptions regarding the future -have not proven correct after the close of the 20th century, then perhaps the relationship between our time and the origin of the belief in human rights and human dignity need not be a tragic one. Treating this relationship as contingent opens up more space for historical complexity and allows for more hope. Indeed, insofar as it has been confirmed, I
believe that we should remove Jellinek's thesis from Weber's framework. Weber assumed that the only alternative to cultural Protestantism, with its sometimes superficial and evolutionistic optimism about the future, was a heroic pessimism that defends liberal individualism against the tendencies threatening its existence together with a stark Kierkegaardian "Either- Liberating Jellinek's thesis from Weber's framework also permits us to conceive of the belief in human rights as something other than a sacralization or charismatization of reason. The sacralization of reason touches only one side of human existence and does not affect all people in equal degree. But the belief in human dignity and human rights does affect all of us --and in equal degree. It sacralizes the young and the old, the intelligent and the mentally retarded. When we speak of the "charisma of reason", our attention is misdirected-towards Jacobinism and Bolshevism, two political world views whose human rights record is not particularly admirable.
The belief in human rights rests in fact on a sacralization of the individual; it is inspired, or so I wish to claim, by a "sacralization" or a "charisma of the person". During the 18 th century, of course, this charisma of the person was articulated within a framework of rationalistic convictions-in Jefferson and Kant, for example; today, however, we can and must separate
